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a b s t r a c t
A commonly voiced concern with the Bayes factor is that, unlike many other Bayesian and non-Bayesian
quantitative measures of model evaluation, it is highly sensitive to the parameter prior. This paper argues
that,whendealingwith psychologicalmodels that are quantitatively instantiated theories, being sensitive
to the prior is an attractive feature of a model evaluation measure. This assertion follows from the
observation that in psychological models parameters are not completely unknown, but correspond to
psychological variables about which theory often exists. This theory can be formally captured in the prior
range and prior distribution of the parameters, indicating which parameter values are allowed, likely,
unlikely and forbidden. Because the prior is a vehicle for expressing psychological theory, it should, like
themodel equation, be considered as an integral part of themodel. It is argued that the combined practice
of building models using informative priors, and evaluating models using prior sensitive measures
advances knowledge.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The marginal likelihood is often celebrated for providing an
automatically built-in Ockham’s razor, balancing goodness-of-fit
and complexitywhen evaluatingmodels. However, even advocates
of Bayesian methods often bemoan there is a price to be paid for
fully taking advantage of the benefits of the marginal likelihood:
it is very sensitive to the prior over the model’s parameters.
For example, in their landmark paper about the Bayes factor,
which is the ratio of two marginal likelihoods, Kass and Raftery
(1995, p. 792) note that one of the ‘‘chief limitations of Bayes
factors are their sensitivity to . . . the choice of priors’’. The prior
sensitivity of the marginal likelihood has not only been lamented
in statistics (e.g., Aitkin, 1991; Bayarri & Berger, 2000; Efron, 1986;
Gelman, 2008; Kass, 1993; O’Hagan, 1995; Wasserman, 1996),
but also in more applied fields like sociology (e.g., Xie, 1999),
marketing (e.g., Rossi & Allenby, 2003), economics (e.g., Koop &
Potter, 1999), biology (e.g., Anderson, Link, Johnson, & Burnham,
2001), and psychology (e.g., Grünwald, 2000; Liu & Aitkin, 2008;
Myung & Pitt, 1997).
This paper attempts to redeem the marginal likelihood and the
Bayes factor by highlighting an alternative perspective on the prior
and on prior sensitivity in model evaluation. The key argument of
the paper is that, if models are quantitatively instantiated theories,
the prior can be used to capture theory and should therefore
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doi:10.1016/j.jmp.2010.07.003be considered as an integral part of the model. The viewpoint
that the prior can be used as a vehicle for expressing theory
implies that a model evaluation measure should be sensitive to
the prior. Only a model evaluation measure that is sensitive to
the prior is informed by all aspects of the model that capture
theory and provides a complete test of the theory embodied in the
model. Thus, themarginal likelihood is an appropriate measure for
evaluating psychological models precisely because of its sensitivity
to the prior.
The paper starts with a classification of commonly used
measures for model evaluation, with the distinction of interest
being the one between prior measures (which are always sensitive
to the prior) and posterior measures (which can be insensitive
to the prior). Next, it is illustrated how the prior can be used
to capture psychological theory. Giving the prior the careful
attention it deserves when building a model often results in an
informative prior, indicating which parameter values are allowed
and which are not, and which are likely and which are not. The
following section argues that prior measures are preferable over
posterior measures for evaluating psychological models. Finally,
it is highlighted that it is critical to check the robustness of
conclusions against arbitrary and ad hoc assumptions, but that
the prior does not necessarily reflect an arbitrary assumption and
therefore should not always be subjected to a sensitivity analysis.
2. Prior and posterior measures of model evaluation
At face value,many quantitativemeasures formodel evaluation
seem to differ widely (see, e.g., Pitt & Myung, 2002; Shiffrin,
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spirit, most of them are largely similar. In one way or the other,
most measures evaluate a model by assessing the fit or match
between observed, human data and generated, model-based data
(i.e., the predictions made by the model). This model evaluation
strategy can be broken down in two distinct steps: making the
predictions (i.e., generating the model-based data) and comparing
the predictions to the observed data (i.e., assessing the fit between
the model-based data and the human data). Model evaluation
measures can differ in each of these steps. Different possibilities
concerning the second step include the squared error or the
deviance. This paper focuses on different approaches concerning
the first step: making the predictions.
2.1. Making predictions
For a model that is a point hypothesis, containing no
free parameters, making a prediction is straightforward, and
quantitative model evaluation is fairly easy. Just measuring the
discrepancy between the unambiguous model predictions and
the empirical data will do the job. Unfortunately, models in this
sense are very rare. Most often, psychologists deal with models
containing one or more free parameters. Rather than a single
prediction, a parameterized model makes several predictions.
Intuitively, one can most usefully imagine that at each different
parameter value the model makes a different prediction.
The abundance of predictions of a parameterized model makes
evaluating a model a non-trivial task. Model evaluation involves
deciding exactly which predictions should be compared to the
empirical data or, equivalently, deciding which parameter values
should be used for generating the model-based data. This decision
involves at least two separate issues.
The first issue concerns how many different parameter values
should be used to make the predictions. Some measures,
such as the Percentage of Variance Accounted For (PVAF), the
Maximum Likelihood Criterion (MLC: e.g., Myung, 2003) and its
nephews the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC: Akaike, 1973;
Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004) and the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC: Schwarz, 1978; Wagenmakers, 2007), consider
the model’s prediction at a single parameter value only. Other
measures instead rely on a broad range of predictions across
different parameter values. Examples of such measures include
the marginal likelihood (Jeffreys, 1935; Kass & Raftery, 1995;
Lee & Wagenmakers, 2005; Myung & Pitt, 1997), the Deviance
Information Criterion (DIC: Myung, Karabatsos, & Iverson, 2005;
Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & van der Linde, 2002), the Posterior
Likelihood Ratio (PLR: Aitkin, Boys, & Chadwick, 2005) and the
Posterior Predictive Loss Criterion (PPLC: Gelfand & Ghosh, 1998).
Typically, the overall fit of the model is taken to be the average fit
across all of the parameter values considered.
The second issue concerns which (set of) parameter value(s)
should be used to generate the model-based data. One approach is
to consider all parameter values that are allowed by the model. A
prominent example of this approach is the marginal likelihood. An
alternative approach is to only consider those parameter value(s)
that could have generated the empirically observed data.Measures
adopting this approach include PVAF, MLC, AIC, BIC, DIC, PLR, and
PPLC. Note that in the first approach the predictions are made
without having a look at the empirical data, whereas the second
approach is data-informed in the sense that the predictions are
based on the observed data.
The first distinction, of single versus multiple predictions,
has often been characterized as one between local versus global
(e.g., Navarro, Pitt, & Myung, 2004; Pitt, Kim, Navarro, & Myung,
2006; Pitt, Myung, Montenegro, & Pooley, 2008). This paper is
concerned with the second distinction, of data-uninformed versusdata-informed predictions. In line with the terminology used in
the statistical literature, a method relying on data-uninformed
predictions will be referred to as prior, and a method making use
of data-informed predictions will be referred to as posterior.1 Prior
refers to the fact that the predictions are made before having seen
the data, while posterior indicates that the predictions are made
after having seen the data.2
2.2. Semi-posterior measures
There is a sense in which a posterior measure of model
evaluation uses the same data twice, in both steps of the model
evaluation. In the first step, the observed data are used to select
the parameter values that generate the model’s predictions. In the
second step, the predictions are compared to the very same data
used tomake the predictions. This is not necessarily a bad practice,
but it highlights the possibility of yet a third approach.
In this approach, which can be called semi-posterior, the
empirical data are split up in two parts, and each part is used in one
of the two model evaluation steps only. The first part of the data is
used to find the parameter values that could have generated the
(first part of the) data. The predictions are made based on these
data-informed parameter values. Rather than comparing these
predictions to the first part of the data again, they are compared
to the second part of the data. Thus, making the predictions relies
on the calibration data, evaluating the predictions relies on the
validation data.3
The best known example of the semi-posterior approach
is cross-validation (CV: Stone, 1974). The generalization crite-
rion (GC: Busemeyer &Wang, 2000; Mosier, 1951) is a variation to
CV in the sense that, unlike CV, it requires the calibration and vali-
dation data to be collected using different experimental designs. In
principle, both CV andGC can be applied in both a local and a global
fashion, but most applications seem to rely on a single prediction.
2.3. Blurring the boundaries
Model evaluation measures differ in (at least) two dimensions:
(1) do they measure the (mis)match between the validation
data and a single model prediction (locally, based on a single
parameter value) or between the validation data and severalmodel
predictions (globally, based on multiple parameter values); and
(2) are the predictions made without calibration data (prior) or
with reliance on calibration data (posterior if the calibration data
are the same as the validation data or semi-posterior if they are
different)? Table 1 shows a schematic classification of different
commonly used measures for model evaluation according to these
distinctions.
The classification presented in Table 1 is somewhat of a
simplification, in the sense that it ignores the fact that some of
the measures are sometimes used as a mixture of a prior and
a posterior measure. For example, some applications of the MLC
rely on a prediction at a parameter value that is selected based
on observed data, but from within a certain a priori defined
range (e.g., Myung, 2003). Used in this fashion, MLC is not purely
1 This terminology has not always been used consistently. For example, Liu and
Aitkin (2008) somewhat confusingly use ‘‘global’’ and ‘‘local’’ to refer to ‘‘prior’’ and
‘‘posterior’’ methods.
2 A prediction made after having seen the data does not map well onto our
common sense, everyday notion of what a prediction is. In everyday language,
prediction tends to refer to, in this terminology, a prior prediction. A posterior
prediction, made after having seen the data, can be called a postdiction.
3 From this perspective, a posterior measure corresponds to the extreme case
where the calibration data and the validation data are the same.
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Classification of common quantitative measures for model evaluation.
Local Global
Prior – Marginal likelihood
Posterior PVAF, MLC, AIC, BIC DIC, PLR, PPLC
Semi-posterior CV, GC –
Note: PVAF is the Percentage of Variance Accounted For; MLC is the Maximum
Likelihood Criterion; AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion; BIC is the Bayesian
Information Criterion; DIC is the Deviance Information Criterion; PLR is the
Posterior Likelihood Ratio; PPLC is the Posterior Predictive Loss Criterion; CV is the
Cross-Validation; GC is the Generalization Criterion.
posterior, since the prediction is not exclusively determined by the
observed data, but it is also not purely prior, since the prediction
is made after having seen the data. Similarly, some applications
of the marginal likelihood assume a uniform prior over a range
that is chosen to include most of the mass of the likelihood
function (e.g., Lee, 2004). Used in this fashion, the marginal
likelihood is not purely prior, since the ‘‘prior’’ is chosen by looking
at the observed data, but it is also not purely posterior, since it
considers parameter values that did not generate the data.
The fact that themarginal likelihood can be used as amixture of
a prior and a posterior measure underscores that the classification
in Table 1 of the marginal likelihood as a prior measure indicates
its common use, rather than its nature. In fact, one could not only
consider a prior marginal likelihood (i.e., without calibration data)
but also a posterior marginal likelihood (i.e., where the calibration
data and the validation data are the same) and different sorts of
semi-posteriormarginal likelihoods (i.e., where the calibration and
validation data differ).4 A unifying perspective on these and other
variations to the marginal likelihood, as well as investigations of
the asymptotic behavior of these measures, is provided by Gelfand
and Dey (1994). Similarly, measures that are typically used in a
posterior fashion, such as DIC, could as well be used in a prior
or semi-posterior fashion. Since yet little is known about the
performance of such variations, their good performance should not
be taken for granted and deserves careful study.
3. Formalizing psychological theory
3.1. Priors express theory
One risk of relying on quantitative measures as the ones
discussed in the previous section is that it is easy to lose sight of the
purposes for which models are evaluated. It is, however, critical to
recognize that model evaluation serves different goals, depending
on the type of model that is evaluated. It is useful to distinguish
between two types of formal models that are currently in use in
psychology. The distinction of interest concerns whether or not
the model implements a psychological theory (see, e.g., Kruschke,
2010; Taagepera, 2007).
Descriptive models are generally devoid of any psychological
theory. Most off-the-shelf statistical models, such as regression
models and generalized linear models are of this type. The goal
of evaluating such a theory-free, generic model is to extract
information available in the data. For example, researchers
have evaluated formal statistical models to investigate whether
typically developing children outperform children with Attention
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder on the Wisconsin Card Sorting
4 Within this semi-posterior approach, one can further distinguish between
calibration and validation data coming from the same experimental design or
from different experimental designs. In statistics, the same-design semi-posterior
counterpart of the prior Bayes factor is known as the partial Bayes factor (O’Hagan,
1995), and its posterior counterpart is known as the posterior Bayes factor (Aitkin,
1991).Test (Geurts, Verté, Oosterlaan, Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004;
Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010). In this
approach, the model is used for data analysis (e.g., Gelman, Carlin,
Stern, & Rubin, 2004; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson,
2009; Wetzels, Raaijmakers, Jakab, & Wagenmakers, 2009).
Explanatory models, in contrast, quantitatively instantiate the-
ories. Most psychological process models are explanatory, detail-
ing, for example, the processes and mechanisms that the hu-
man brain uses to learn, perceive, make decisions, and so on. The
goal of evaluating such a theory-laden model is to provide infor-
mation about the model and the theory it represents. Model and
data are brought in contact with each other with the purpose of
theory testing—assessing to what extent the psychological the-
ory formalized in the model can be supported.5 For example, re-
searchers have evaluated formal psychological models to inves-
tigate whether people learn a category by abstracting informa-
tion from the encountered category examples (see Nosofsky, 1992;
Vanpaemel & Storms, 2010, for overviews). In this approach, the
data are used formodel analysis (e.g., Pitt et al., 2006).
When building a formal psychological model (for example,
by formalizing a verbal theory), typically most effort is devoted
to come up with the model equation—a function that describes
how psychological variables give rise to behavior on a task.
Generally, the behavior the model attempts to represent is not
fundamentally understood, and the model builder is forced to
represent the psychological variables in themodel equation by free
parameters. Although free parameters are included in the model
because the model builder is faced with unknown variables, it is a
mistake to assume that free parameters are completely unknown.
Psychological theorizingmight not be advanced enough to fix each
free parameter to a single value, but often at least some knowledge,
theory, assumptions, or intuitions about the variables represented
by the parameters exists.
Crucially, existing theory about parameters is not easily
expressed in the model equation. Often, this sort of knowledge
should be captured in the rangeof the parameters, indicatingwhich
parameter values are allowed and which are forbidden, and in
the distribution over the parameters, indicating which parameter
values of the allowable parameter variation are likely and which
are unlikely. Since, like the model equation, the parameter range
and distribution are specified before the data are observed, they
are often referred to as the prior range and the prior distribution,
or jointly, the prior.
In sum, theorists interested in formally instantiating a theory
do not only have the model equation at their disposition, but can
also use the range and the distribution over the parameters to
formalize theoretical knowledge, intuitions or assumptions that
are otherwise difficult to incorporate in a model. To support
the claim that the model equation is not the only vehicle for
formalizing psychological theory but that also the prior can, I focus
on two simple examples considered by Liu and Aitkin (2008) in a
recent criticism on the Bayes factor.
3.2. Decision maker
Liu and Aitkin (2008) discuss two hypotheses about a decision
maker. The first hypothesis states that the decision maker is
indifferent between two alternatives, which is formally expressed
5 It is meaningless to ask if a psychological model is true or not. A model
that instantiates a verbal theory is, at best, a relatively rough approximation to
an infinitely complex reality. Busemeyer and Diederich (2009, p. 6) note that all
psychological models are ‘‘deliberately constructed to be simple representations
that only capture the essentials of the cognitive systems. Thus, we know, a priori,
that all models are wrong in some details’’.
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hypothesis assumes that the decision maker can be biased, which
is formally expressed by the rate being anywhere between 0 and
1. Consider now the common situation where one of the two
alternatives is correct and the other is incorrect (imagine, for
instance, a recall memory test). A third hypothesis that in this
contextmight deserve interest is that the decisionmaker performs
better than chance. This hypothesis is formally expressed by the
rate being anywhere between 12 and 1.
Crucially, themodel equations of these threemodels are identi-
cal. The different theoretical positions between an indifferent, a bi-
ased, and an above-chance decisionmaker are expressed bymeans
of the parameter range. The biased hypothesis imposes the com-
mon sense boundaries of zero and one. The above-chance hypothe-
sis cuts this range in half. And the indifference hypothesis restricts
the range to a single value. This is a very simple example of how
theory can be expressed outside of the model equation.
3.3. Retention
Liu and Aitkin (2008) further discuss a study by Lee (2004),
who focuses on five retention functions, each relying on two
parameters, b and m, to specify the proportion of correct recall at
time t , pc(t, b,m). The model equations are given by
pc(t, b,m) = b−mt, (1)
pc(t, b,m) = 1mt + b , (2)
pc(t, b,m) = b exp(−mt), (3)
pc(t, b,m) = b−m ln t, (4)
and
pc(t, b,m) = bt−m, (5)
for the linear, hyperbolic, exponential, logarithmic, and power
model, respectively. Further, Lee (2004) assumes a uniform
distribution over the following intervals:
m ∈ [0, 2] (6)
and
b ∈ [0, 2]. (7)
The intuitions captured in these models are at odds with basic
common sense. In particular, themodels can predict proportions of
correct recall that exceed one,which does not seem tomake a lot of
sense. For example,when t = 0, the power and logarithmicmodels
predict, irrespective of the exact value of b and m, the proportion
of correct recall to be infinite. Further, when t = 0, the exponential
model makes the impossible prediction that, for any value of b
above one, the proportion of correct recall is greater than one.6
Consider now the following redefinitions of the five models:
pc(t, b,m) = max(0, b−mt), (8)
pc(t, b,m) = bmt + 1 , (9)
pc(t, b,m) = b exp(−mt), (10)
pc(t, b,m) = max(0, b−m ln(t + 1)), (11)
pc(t, b,m) = b(t + 1)−m, (12)
with
m > 0, (13)
and
b ∈ [0, 1]. (14)
6 See also Myung (2003, Equation 13) for a similar model definition allowing
impossible predictions.The predictions of these models accord with common sense, as the
proportion of correct recall pc cannot exceed one at any time, nor
can it drop below zero, irrespective of whether the retention was
actually measured at that time.
Importantly, the models in Eq. (8) to (14) do more than simply
avoiding impossible predictions. In particular, the range of m
expresses a basic psychological intuition: Restrictingm to positive
values assures that ∂pc (t,b,m)
∂t < 0, for all values of b and m. The
first derivative being negative implies that the models assume
decreasing retention curves. Thus, the range of m, in Eq. (13),
formally captures the basic psychological assumption that people
forget.
Also the range of b can be used to express a psychologically
meaningful position. To see this, it is useful to consider the model
equations at the boundary condition of t = 0 (i.e., immediately
after the study phase). For all models, we find pc(0, b,m) =
b, indicating that b can be interpreted as the initial proportion
of correct recall. In this light, changing Eq. (14) to b ∈ [ 12 , 1]
expresses the psychological intuition that people have actually
learned something during the study phase and will perform above
chance.
3.4. Informative priors as an antidote to the Greek letter syndrome
Model builders often suffer from what can be called the Greek
letter syndrome (Lindley, 1999). Sufferers do not consider the
meaning of a parameter and thus ignore the existing theory about
the variable the parameter represents. For them, the parameter
is just a (often Greek, in the retention example Roman) letter.
It is, however, crucial to appreciate that the free parameters in
explanatory models correspond to variables with a theoretical
interpretation. Because parameters are theoretically meaningful,
there are often intuitions about which parameters values are
allowed, likely, unlikely, or forbidden before data have been
observed. This kind of information can be expressed in the
parameter prior, in the form of a range and a distribution.7 Thus,
rather than regarded as a nuisance necessary to get the Bayesian
modelingmachinery going, the prior should be embraced bymodel
builders as an additional opportunity to express theory.
The realization that the prior expresses psychological theory
brings about an increased responsibility for the model builder.
When building a model, all aspects of the model, not just the
model equation, should be given careful thought. Rather than being
lazy and imprecise about the parameter range and distribution,
model builders cannot shirk the responsibility of thoughtfully
specifying the prior, articulating their ideas and intuitions about
the psychological variables in the model. At the very least, the
prior should be such that it gives zero prior weight to impossible
predictions, such as proportions smaller than zero or larger than
one. At best, the prior should be chosen to reflect psychological
theory and intuitions, such as the assumption that people forget
or that people perform better than chance after a study phase. Not
having any psychological theory about the variables represented
by the parameters, or not caring to translate it results in a prior
with a broad range and a diffuse distribution. In contrast, using the
range and distribution to express theory gives rise to a prior with
a narrow range and a sharply peaked distribution. Such a prior is
known as an informative prior. Thus, the status of the prior as a
bearer of theory calls for informative priors, whenever possible.
7 The simple examples given above illustrate how theory can be captured in
the range. In a similar spirit, the distribution of parameters can also translate
theoretical assumptions. For example, Vanpaemel & Lee (submitted for publication)
demonstrate how the idea of optimal attention allocation, which is one of the
core psychological assumptions of the Generalized Context Model of category
learning (Nosofsky, 1986), can be captured using the prior distribution over the
model’s attention parameters.
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rich models, the prior captures theory. This implies that specifying
an informative prior is a crucial part of the model building process,
as crucial as constructing the model equation. One might object
that model builders do not know whether the theory expressed in
their prior is correct. This is definitely the case, but exactly the same
observation holds for the model equation. The goal of building
a formal model is to make it possible to quantitatively evaluate
whether intuitions and theories are viable. For theorists who know
that their ideas are correct, there is no point in engaging in theory
testing. Another reasonable concern with the position that priors
are vehicles for expressing theory is that the specification of the
prior is a delicate task. But again, so is the specification of themodel
equation. No formal guidelines about how to capture theory into
a prior exist, just like there are no formal guidelines about how
to capture theory into a model equation. Model building crucially
depends on the skill and the creativity of the modeler and cannot
be automated.
4. Prior sensitivity in theory testing
Prior and posterior measures differ in their sensitivity to the
prior. In a prior measure, the parameter values that generate
the model’s predictions are drawn from the prior distribution
over the parameters. Consequently, the predictions, and hence
the model evaluation relying on these predictions, are, by design,
sensitive to the prior. In a posterior measure, in contrast, the
prediction-generating parameter values are drawn from the
posterior distribution, which is the data-updated version of the
prior distribution. In principle, the posterior distribution, and
hence the posterior predictions and the model evaluation relying
on these predictions, is affected by the exact choice of the prior.
However, as data provide sufficient information, they overwhelm
the prior, and the posterior is hardly influenced by the prior. Thus
unlike priormeasures, posteriormeasures are not always sensitive
to the prior.
Even among adherents of Bayesian methods, the sensitivity
of prior measures to the choice of the prior has been a serious
source of concern (e.g., Kass & Raftery, 1995; Myung & Pitt, 1997).
However, in the light of the argument of the previous section that
in theory-ladenmodels the prior can capture psychological theory,
the prior sensitivity of prior measures is unproblematic and even
desirable. In particular, in this section I argue that when priors
are judiciously constructed to capture psychological theory, being
sensitive to the prior is an asset rather than a nuisance. To provide
a complete test of the theory formalized in a psychological model,
a model evaluation measure should be sensitive to all the different
aspects of the model that express psychological theory: the model
equation, the parameter range, and the parameter distribution.
4.1. Prior measures are unproblematic
To illustrate the issue of prior sensitivity in model evaluation,
consider the exponential retention model assuming [0, 2] as the
range for b. When a prior measure is used to evaluate this model, it
will be evaluated on the impossible prior predictions it generates,
such as a proportion of correct recall larger than one. Since the
observed proportion will, of course, be smaller than one, the prior
prediction will not be confirmed and the model will be penalized.
Thus when the assumption of exponential retention is tested by
means of a formal model that assumes [0, 2] as the range for b, the
priormeasure’s sensitivity to the prior leads to an unfair test of this
assumption.
When the same model is evaluated using a posterior measure
and data are sufficiently informative, the only predictions that
are used in the evaluation are those that can generate theobserved data. So despite the fact that the model can make
impossible predictions, the impossible predictions are most likely
not considered when the model is evaluated, and the model is
not penalized for its impossible, and thus wrong, predictions. Thus
when the assumption of exponential retention is tested by means
of a formal model that assumes [0, 2] as the range for b, the
posterior measure’s insensitivity to the prior leads to a fair test of
this assumption.
In this light, it might seem that prior measures are problematic
and should be abandoned in favor of posterior measures (e.g., Liu
& Aitkin, 2008). There is, however, a second remedy to make
sure that a model is not unfairly penalized for making impossible
predictions. Quite simply, it involves making sure the model does
notmake impossible predictions. Asmentioned earlier, if the range
of b is restricted to [0, 1] rather than to [0, 2], the exponential
retention model stops making impossible predictions. When this
model is used to represent the assumption that people forget
exponentially, thehe prior measure no longer provides an unfair
test of this assumption. Thus, when a prior is cautiously picked to
translate plausible theory, a prior measure of model evaluation is
not problematic at all.
4.2. Prior measures are desirable
As a second example, consider two different exponential
retention models, one that assumes that people forget and one
that is agnostic about whether people actually forget. The different
theoretical positions taken by these models are expressed by their
priors. The first model assumes an informative prior by restricting
m to positive values only. The second model, in contrast, allowsm
to be any real number.
Suppose that sufficiently informative data are observed, such
that the prior has been overwhelmed by the data. Further, suppose
that the observed proportions of correct recall decrease over time,
indicating that people forget. In this situation, prior and posterior
model evaluation measures provide different conclusions. Using a
posterior measure, both models perform similarly to each other.
There is no preference for the informative model, which assumes
that people forget, or for the other model, which is mute about
forgetting. This state of affairs contrasts markedly with prior
measures. Using a priormeasure, themodel assuming the observed
behavior (i.e., people forget) is rewarded for its correct intuition,
and is preferred over the model that did not take a stand.
In sum, the posterior measure is insensitive to one of the core
assumptions of the retentionmodels:whether or not people forget.
Although both models instantiate a different theory, they perform
alike under a posterior measure. The posterior measure provides
an incomplete test of the theory embodied in the models. The
prior measure, in contrast, provides a complete test, as it is highly
sensitive to the theoretical position the retention models adopt
about retention.
4.3. Prior measures encourages precise models
The previous example brings to light that a theorist using a
posterior measure to evaluate a model can take the prior range of
any parameter, whatever its psychological meaning, to equal the
full real line and the prior distribution to be any vague distribution,
such as the uniform distribution. By observing data and updating
this prior, the correct range and distribution of the parameters
is found, and these are used for assessing the fit between model
and data. No pressure is laid on the theorist to come up with a
theoretically motivated range and distribution; all the hard work
is done by the data. In contrast, when a model is evaluated using
a prior measure, the theorist needs to be much more judicious
about the priors. Assigning a non-zero or high prior weight to
parameter values that lead to bad fits will damage the model’s
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parameter values generate predictions that are confirmed by the
data, the model is rewarded for the risk it took.
Posterior measures provide theorists with no incentive to think
carefully about their parameters and formalize precise intuitions
about them. With sufficiently informative data, it is possible to
get away with imprecise intuitions about the parameters. The
retention theorist can gain nothing by positing that retention
increases or decreases. Worse yet, the theorist can only lose by
doing so: The more vague a model is about its parameter values,
the more likely it is to perform well on a posterior measure.
Thus, posterior measures encourage vague and empty models.
Prior measures, in contrast, encourage theorists to think carefully
and to take a stand. The retention theorist is forced to think
about whether retention actually increases, decreases, or can do
both. Since prior measures encourage the practice of building
models with specific, strong assumptions, prior measures increase
knowledge and advance science.
4.4. Conclusion
Both examples illustrated that posterior measures can be
insensitive to the prior. Prior measures, in contrast, are, by design,
always sensitive to the prior, regardless of the number of data. In
the first example, the prior insensitivity of the posterior measure
was helpful, since the theory captured in the prior was absurd—it
allowed proportions to be smaller than zero and larger than one.
However, the observation that the retention models formalized
in Eq. (1) to (7) make prior predictions that are clearly false
should not be taken as an argument to abandon prior measures
in favor of posterior measures. Instead, it should be taken as an
encouragement to be more thoughtful when formalizing a prior.
In the second example, the prior insensitivity of the posterior
measure was unwanted, since it implied that the posterior
measure was insensitive to one of the core psychological
assumptions of the models under consideration. The posterior
measure provided an incomplete test, and encouraged vague and
weak models. Thanks to its sensitivity to the prior, the prior
measure provided a complete test and encouraged precise, strong
models.
A model evaluation measure that is always sensitive to all
theoretical assumptions embodied in the model seems to contrast
favorablywith one that is not guaranteed to be sensitive to all of the
theory. A model evaluation measure that encourages theorists to
be precise and to articulate their stance seems to bemore attractive
than one that encourages theorists to be vague and theoretically
empty. For these reasons, prior measures are to be preferred over
posterior measures when evaluating psychological models.
5. Sensitivity analyses in theory testing
Because the marginal likelihood is known to be highly sensitive
to the prior, it is often stressed that it is important to check
that conclusions based on the marginal likelihood are not too
sensitive to the choice of the prior, in the form of a sensitivity
analysis (Kass & Raftery, 1995; Myung & Pitt, 1997; Sinharay
& Stern, 2002). I agree that sensitivity analyses to arbitrary
assumptions are critical when engaging in model evaluation.
However, the recommendation of performing sensitivity analyses
to the prior when using the marginal likelihood seems to rest on
three assumptions that need correction: the prior is always an
unavoidable source of arbitrariness; only users of prior measures
should perform a sensitivity analysis to the prior; and the prior is
the major (or even only) source of arbitrariness. In this section, I
clarify that as the prior, just like the model equation, expresses
psychological theory, it is not necessarily arbitrary and thus notnecessarily requires a sensitivity analysis. Further, I argue that
much more than users of prior measures, users of posterior
measures should perform sensitivity analyses to the prior. Finally, I
indicate thatmany other aspects of theory testing involve arbitrary
assumptions and that, much more than the prior, these aspects
warrant a sensitivity analysis.
5.1. Sensitivity to arbitrary assumptions in model building
Model building – formalizing theory and intuitions into a
formal model – is a non-trivial undertaking and often requires
making ad hoc or arbitrary assumptions. The reason is that the
theory the formal model is designed to represent is not always
precise enough to give rise to a single and unique formal model.
Arbitrary assumptions can arise in any place where theory is
expressed: the range, the distribution, and the model equation.
For example, different theorists have all attempted to evaluate
‘‘the’’ hyperbolic model of retention, but a quick glance at the
literature shows that at least three different model equations
have been used to formalize the assumption that retention occurs
hyperbolically (Cavagnaro, Pitt, &Myung, 2009; Lee, 2004; Navarro
et al., 2004). Just like the model equation, the prior can also reflect
ad hoc or arbitrary assumptions. For example, as noted earlier,
when evaluating the retention models, Lee (2004) picked two as
the upper bound of the m parameter, without any theoretical,
psychologically motivated justification for this choice.8 As there
was no principled reason the upper bound ofmwas not, say, three,
the choice of two is clearly an arbitrary one.
Arbitrariness in model building should inspire caution. Ideally,
conclusions should be independent of any arbitrariness involved
in the models, and it is the responsibility of the researcher to
check the robustness of the results against arbitrary decisions.
Consequently, researchers interested in evaluating the assumption
of hyperbolic retention should consider different model equations
translating this assumption, unless they have non-arbitrary, well-
motivated reasons to prefer one model equation over the others.
By the same token, if the prior involves an arbitrary decision, a
sensitivity analysis should be performed. For example, the upper
bound of m is an arbitrary choice and the sensitivity of the
conclusion to this choice should be assessed.9
However, it is a mistake to assume that a prior is inevitably
ad hoc. For example, choosing zero as the lower bound of m is
not a theoretically-empty, arbitrary whim. Rather, it represents a
clear theoretical position: It translates the core assumption that
people forget, as negative values of m would allow increasing
retention curves. Likewise, picking [ 12 , 1] as the range for b is not an
arbitrary decision. It is a theoretically-motivated choice, because
it translates the assumption that after a study phase people will
perform above chance (by the lower bound), and will not correctly
classifymore items than they are tested on (by the upper bound). If
the prior involves a theoretically motivated decision, a sensitivity
analysis is not required.10
Further, relying on a posterior model evaluation measure does
not exempt the researcher from performing a sensitivity analysis
to the prior. Posterior measures may be less influenced by the
8 Lee (2004) motivated this choice by sneak-peeking at the data rather than by
theoretical considerations.
9 Fig. 1 in Lee (2004) provides such an analysis, as it indicates that extending the
range ofm beyond two does not result in a significant increase of mass of any of the
models.
10 Obviously, the fact that the range of a parameter is non-arbitrary should not
be taken to mean that this particular range is correct, or beyond scrutiny. Indeed,
the underlying theory it expresses might be wrong. Non-arbitrary just means that
it expresses a (possibly wrong) theory.
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the prior, especially when data sets are small. Moreover, I suspect
that most users of posterior measures do not consider the prior
as a vehicle for expressing theory—if they did they would rely on
prior measures. Without a commitment to the prior as a bearer of
theory, the prior necessarily corresponds to an atheoretical and
hence arbitrary decision and a sensitivity analysis to the prior
is necessary. Thus it seems that especially the users of posterior
measures, rather than the users of prior measures, should make
sure that their conclusions do not depend too heavily on the choice
of the prior.
5.2. Sensitivity to arbitrary assumptions outside model building
The above discussion focused on arbitrariness in model
building. Of course, theory testing involves more that only this
single step, and all the additional steps are also prone to ad hoc
assumptions. The conclusions based on both prior and posterior
measures can be sensitive to these arbitrary assumptions, and
ideally, their robustness should be checked.
First, theory testing involves a host of technical decisions,which
are at best governed by rules of thumb. Examples include the
choice of the optimization or sampling algorithm, the starting
points of the algorithm, the number of MCMC chains, and the
number of (burned-in and recorded) samples in a chain. To the
extent that these decisions are arbitrary, they should be subject to
a sensitivity analysis.
Secondly, theory testing often involves the choice of a likelihood
function. For example, for the retention models, both a Gaussian
and a Binomial likelihood seem justifiable (see Lee, 2004; Myung,
2003, for both uses), and the use of either of these can involve an
arbitrary decision. Even settling for a Gaussian likelihood leaves
one with a choice of the variance. As this choice most likely
involves some degree of arbitrariness, a check of the robustness
of the conclusion against different choices for the variance is
necessary.11
Finally, theory testing also involves experimental design, data
collection, truncation, and transformation, which all involve
various ad hoc decisions. For example, with the retention models,
there seems to be little theoretical ground to decide whether or
not the retention interval should be scaled to lie between zero
and one, or should instead reflect the exact measurements. Since
scaling or not influences the conclusion, this decision either calls
for a theoretical argument of why one choice is preferable over
the other or for a sensitivity analysis. Further, the range, number
and spacing of the time points, the difficulty of the task, and the
exact experimental methodology (e.g., free recall vs cued recall)
all involve more or less ad hoc decisions. Consequently, these
choices should be motivated or their effects on the conclusion
should be checked. Amotivation for choices of experimental design
can derive from design optimization (Myung & Pitt, 2009). A
sensitivity analysis can consist of performing ameta-analysis using
a range of data sets spanning a wide variety of conditions (see, for
examples, Lee, 2004; Navarro et al., 2004; Rubin & Wenzel, 1996).
6. Letting the model speak for itself
Progress in psychology is becoming increasingly reliant on
formal models. The increasing popularity of formal models makes
it all the more important to have a clear understanding of the
11 An example of such a sensitivity analysis is provided in Figs. 4 and 5 of Lee
(2004), showing how inference changes across a range of choices for the variance
in the Gaussian likelihood.roles and purposes of models. An important distinction between
formal models is their theoretical content. Psychology, like most
empirical sciences, relies on generic, theory-free models, as well
as on hand-crafted theory-rich models, designed to represent a
psychological theory. The basic claim of this paper is that in
these latter psychological models, parameters are not just random,
unknown numbers. Rather, they represent psychological variables
about which knowledge, expectations, assumptions, theory, or
intuitions exist before data are observed. This kind of information
can be expressed by carefully specifying the prior range and prior
distribution over the parameters, indicating the values parameters
are likely to take, and the relationship between them. In its capacity
of representing theory, the prior is not an arbitrary whim. The
prior is an integral part of the model that serves the exact same
function as the model equation: Formally translating the theorist’s
assumptions to make them amenable to quantitative test.
This paper explored the implications of the viewpoint that
the prior can be used as a vehicle for psychological theory, both
in model building and in model evaluation. In particular, I have
stressed that, when building a model, the prior needs to be given
much more careful thought than is currently practiced and that,
when evaluating a model, sensitivity to the prior is necessary.
As a bearer of psychological theory, the prior should be carefully
chosen and, ideally, be informative.Model builders restricting their
attention only to the model equation do only half of the work.
They should also devote their full attention to the range (indicating
which parameter values are allowed and which are not) and to
the distribution (indicating which parameter values are likely and
which are not) of the parameters, rather than being happy with a
perfunctory definition of the prior. Thinking of a parameter as a
psychologically meaningful variable and translating psychological
theory about this variable in an informative parameter prior leads
to a strong and precise model.
As a bearer of psychological theory, the prior should influence
the model evaluation. Model evaluation measures that are only
sensitive to the model equation do only half of the work. The
evaluation of a model should be informed by all the assumptions
the model is making, not just by the assumptions that happen
to be expressed in the model equation. Only a model evaluation
measure that is also sensitive to the prior provides a complete test
of the theory embodied in themodel (see Vanpaemel, 2009, for the
related observation that also ameasure ofmodel complexity is only
complete if it is sensitive to themodel equation, the prior range and
the prior distribution).
This paper investigated two main approaches to model
evaluation. In prior measures, such as the marginal likelihood,
the parameter values used to make predictions are drawn from
the prior, while in posterior measures, the parameter values
are drawn from the posterior. Prior measures are, by design,
highly sensitive to the prior, whereas posterior measures are not
always guaranteed to be sensitive to the prior. Recognizing that
quantitative model evaluation measures should be sensitive to
the prior, this difference in prior sensitivity implies that prior
measures are more suitable for evaluating psychological models
than posterior measures.
In data analysis, priors have been severely criticized, out of a
desire to let the data speak for themselves. Using a prior adds
‘‘too much model’’, and biases the (data) analysis. This paper does
not deal with data analysis, but rather with model analysis. In
terms of how models and data can interact, model analysis is the
exact opposite of data analysis. In data analysis, a model is used to
learn something about the data. Inmodel analysis, the relationship
between models and data is reversed: The data are used to learn
something about the model. Perhaps ironically, my criticism on
the use of posteriors in model analysis is the mirror image of the
criticism on the use of priors in data analysis. Using a posterior
adds ‘‘too much data’’, and biases the (model) analysis. In model
analysis, we should let the models speak for themselves.
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